It has been traditional practice in the traffic system for desired behaviour to be stimulated by rules, regulations, and laws, resulting in the punishment of offences. Until recently, modifying road user behaviour by reward has not been given much attention in the practice of road safety. In this thesis it was aimed to get a better understanding of the possible role of reward in influencing road user behaviour. The main questions that were addressed are whether rewards are effective in modifying individual road user behaviour, which types of reward (programmes) are more effective than others, which other conditions or circumstances mediate this effectiveness, and whether reward programmes can be successfully applied on a larger scale.
In the first part of the thesis (ISBN: 90-9012343-1) the results of a literature review are reported in which attention is paid to the role of rewards in psychological theories and models of road user behaviour. In addition, an inventory is made of what is known - as becomes apparent from evaluation studies - about the effects of rewards on road user behaviour.
A variety of reward programmes have been studied in the area of road safety. These programmes can be categorised as either outcome-oriented or behaviour-oriented. A number of studies have investigated the effect of (material) rewards on the outcome of 'unspecified driving behviour': accidents versus an accident-free driving record, where it is assumed that the driver is aware what concrete behaviour is required to prevent accidents. Other studies have investigated the effects of rewards on the occurrence of specific discrete behaviours (such as using a safety belt) or their influence on continuous behaviour (speed).
A review of empirical findings in the area of road safety shows that both outcome-oriented and behaviour-oriented reward programmes can be effective, that such programmes generally appear to be viewed positively by the participants, and that these can also be cost-effective from a finacial point of view.
Of all road safetyapplications of behaviour-oriented reward programmes, those directed at discrete behaviours appear to be the most susceptible for finding substantial effects. Therefore, it was decided to first concentrate further research on the effects of rewards on discrete behaviour, and more specifically on the effects of rewards on safety belt use and the factores that mediate the effectiveness.
A number of field studies have been conducted in which the effect of various reward programmes on the use of safety belts was investigated in situations with relatively high baseline levels of belt use. In addition, the effects of 'rewards' as compared to police enforcement were investigated. Furthermore, it was examined - by means of a meta-analysis - how the results of these reward programmes relate to previously reported results, and which characteristics of reward programmes can be determined that mediate the effectiveness of such programmes.
The following general conclusions with regard to the effectiveness of rewards to stimulate safety belt use can be formulated:
A number of advantages of reward programmes can be named in comparison to other approaches not involving rewards. For example, whereas it has been shown that information and media campaigns often do not lead to behaviour change, reward programmes have shown to be effective in accomplishing substantial behaviour change, in particular in the short term. Furthermore, reward programmes may be less costly than enforcement programmes, requiring comparatively less manpower and administrative actions when applied in small-scale environments. In industry, reward programmes generally have appeared to be cost-effective. Another advantage of rewards as compared to 'punishment' is that reward programmes are often considered as measures that are generally rated favourably among the public. Finally, rewards have the advantage over punishment for those (dangerous) behaviours that are not explicitly described by law or that are difficult to check, and are therefore difficult to enforce. Dangerous overtaking and too close following, for example, are behaviours that are difficult for the police to enforce because the proof is difficult to provide. Because rewards are not part of the complicated judicial system, rewards can possibly help to change such behaviours.
However, some problem factors can be anticipated with regard to how rewards can be structurally integrated in the traditional traffic system. These concern the type of behaviour to be rewarded, the nature and scale of the reward programme, the necessity to systematically and carefully monitor the behaviour concerned, and the organisation and agents that set up the programme and deliver the rewards, respectively.
Because rewards have proven to be effective, it can be argued that it would be 'unethical' not to use them, although some have different views about this. The issue of rewarding road users for desired behaviour has been criticized by those who reason that such behaviour should be considered as part of 'normal' road user behaviour, and should therefore not be rewarded; instead deviations from the normative behaviour should be 'punished'. The objection seems more to how the behaviour is being influenced than to the fact that it can be influenced by rewards. In addition, 'punishment' (police enforcement) is built-in into the traffic system, whereas rewards are not. Reward programmes require careful monitoring of the behaviour concerned. Large-scale applications require that reward programmes be implemented in the traffic system, and some organisation or agents should be responsible for the monitoring of behaviour and the delivery of rewards. However, one can be hesitant about government bodies actually rewarding such desired behaviour. These are in fact the same bodies that are supposed to punish breaking the law. One possibility is that private companies or organizations are used to encourage desirable road user behaviour by offering rewards; these could also be the agents that deliver the rewards.
For example, insurance companies could offer incentives for specific (safe) behaviours, such as using a safety belt. However, insurance companies do not appear to be willing to introduce such incentives. Other reward systems that are currently applied in the form of premium discounts that car insurers offer their clients have some drawbacks. For example, these are often not individual rewards in the sense that the discount is determined on a statistical basis for certain population groups. And when discounts depend on the number of years of accident-free driving, these discounts are usually not progressive with the year-to-year accumulation of an accident-free record, and after a certain period of time a 'forgiveness clause' comes in effect which saves drivers from an increase in their insurance fees if they have an accident. Furthermore, it is possible that the loss of a premium discount as a result of submitting a claim is more likely to be regarded as a punishment than its retention is regarded as a reward by the insurance holder. Seen from this perspective, a more effective form of reward would be to repay part of the premium for accident-free driving in a certain period; this is indeed found to be effective in the one study available on this subject.
Structural large-scale implementation of reward programmes is not easy but nonetheless worthwhile to study further, because of the substantial effects found in many studies. Although reward programmes have been most successful in small-scale settings, both in the area of road safety as well as in other fields of application, some larger-scale applications have also shown significant effects.
There are still many questions as how to design the 'ideal' reward programme because in evaluations of reward programmes the characteristics of these programmes have not been systematically varied. In the thesis a list is presented which should be seen as an attempt to provide concrete guidelines which are sometimes based on empirical findings, and sometimes primarily on theoretical considerations. For each guideline it is assessed whether it is mainly based on theoretical considerations or on empirical evidence from evaluation studies; It is also indicated if the guideline is backed up by 'some' or 'strong' empirical support.